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ARCHITECTURAL MALPRACTICE: TOWARD
AN EQUITABLE RULE FOR DETERMINING
WHEN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
BEGINS TO RUN
I. Introduction
In the past thirty years, the architectural profession has been
characterized by dramatic changes in both its legal liabilities and in
its relationship with other members of the construction industry.'
At one time, architects' liability for design defects was limited to
those with whom they enjoyed privity of contract. 2 With the recent
abrogation of the privity doctrine,3 however, strangers to the pro-
fessional relationship may now sue in tort and architects inevitably
1. See infra note 3 and accompanying text. The New York Education Law,
which requires licensing for the practice of architecture, provides the following
definition:
The practice of the profession of architecture is defined as rendering or
offering to render services which require the application of the art, science
and aesthetics of design and construction of buildings, groups of buildings,
including their components and appurtenances and the spaces around
them wherein the safeguarding of life, health, property and public welfare
is concerned. Such services include, but are not limited to consultation,
evaluation, planning, the provision of preliminary studies, designs, con-
struction documents, construction management and the administration of
construction contracts.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7301 (McKinney 1985); see Steiner v. Wenning, 53 A.D.2d
437, 444, 386 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434 (2d Dep't 1976) (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
In general, the courts considering the issue of statute of limitations have subjected
"design professionals," such as engineers and surveyors, to the same rules applied
to architects. Indeed, the term "A/E," for architect/engineer, is commonly used
interchangeably with "design professional." Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v.
Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 346, 499 A.2d 178, 181 (1985).
2. The privity doctrine originated in England with the case of Winterbottom
v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842).
3. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)
(American case generally credited with extending tort liability to third parties). The
leading case for architectural negligence is Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3
N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (19)7).
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find themselves exposed to a multitude of lawsuits. 4 In addition to
this expansion of liability,' the architect's traditional role of designer/
supervisor or "Master Builder ' 6 has been significantly altered by
new construction methods, such as design-build 7 and fast track,' and
4. One commentator reported astonishing figures:
In 1985, there were 44 claims filed for every 100 insured architecture
firms: "This justifies the architect's fear that, regardless of the quality
of his practice, there is a 50-50 chance he will be sued."
From Bauhaus to Courthouse, 13 BARRISTER 24 (1986) (quoting A. Abramowitz,
Associate General Counsel, American Institute of Architects).
The architect's expanding liability encourages the filing of frivolous suits; none-
theless, the architect must endure the trouble and expense of defending these actions.
See, e.g., Easterday v. Masiello, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 1988, at 31, col. 2 (Fla. Jan.
7, 1988). In Easterday, the mother of a man who committed suicide in prison
brought a wrongful death action against the architect and engineer for the con-
struction of the jail on theories of negligence and strict liability. The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the lower court's finding that the architect could not
be held liable for a patent defect. Id. at 31, col. 2; see also Yarbro v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982). In 1977, Yarbro's wife tripped on a
radiator and fell through a window in a hotel designed by noted architect I.M.
Pei. Id. at 824. Decedent's husband brought suit in 1979, nineteen years after
substantial completion of the hotel in question. Id. The Supreme Court of Colorado
declined to hold unconstitutional the state's ten-year statute of repose for design
professionals and affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for Pei.
Id. at 825. See generally Note, The Crumbling Tower of Architectural Immunity:
Evolution and Expansion of the Liability to Third Parties, 45 OHIO STATE L.J.
217 (1984) (discussing architect's expanding tort liability).
5. See also Note, Liability of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties: A
New Approach, 53 NOTRE DmE L. REv. 306, 308-09 (1977); Berreby, Architects:
After the Fall, Nat'l L.J., July 19, 1982, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Berreby].
6. See Jackson, The Role of Contract in Architectural and Engineering Mal-
practice, 51 INs. COUNS. J. 517 (1984) [hereinafter Jackson]. One authority described
the "Master Builder" concept and its implications for architects' liability in the
following manner:
The symbolic "Master-Builder" concept, in which the architect is assumed
to be the final authority in the construction process, regardless of contract,
has been cited as a reason "why so many architects are targets when
something goes wrong"; this outmoded concept militates against the
contractual separation of the traditional A/E functions.
Id. at 521 & n.40 (citing N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1978, at 54, col. 2); see also Kahn,
Introduction: The Changing Role of the Architect, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 216 (1979)
(describing Michaelangelo and da Vinci as "the prototypes of the omniscient master
builder who was charged with responsibility for the total success of a construction
project" and suggesting that a new type of master builder is emerging).
For a general discussion of the traditional building contract arrangement, see J.
Sweet, Owner-Architect-Contractor: Another Eternal Triangle, 47 CALIF. L. REV.
645 (1959) [hereinafter Triangle].
7. "Design-build," sometimes called "turnkey," denotes an arrangement in
which the owner has very little input-sometimes the owner will supply the site
and nothing else. The owner contracts with another party who agrees to perform
both the design and construction phases of the project in an effort to save time
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by new roles, such as construction manager (CM)9 and developer. 10
As a result, the rights and duties of architects today are much less
susceptible to precise definition.
Courts, legislatures and commentators have struggled with the
legal and policy issues which attend the emerging law of architectural
malpractice." Malpractice is properly viewed as a specific type of
and money. See Hapke, Construction Industry Contracts, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 249,
251 (1979) [hereinafter Hapke]. See generally Block, As the Walls Came Tumbling
Down: A rchitects' Expanded Liability Under Design-Build/Construction Contracting,
17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing architect's expanded liability under
design-build); Note, The Architect in the Design-Build Model: Designing and Building
the Case for Strict Liability in Tort, 33 CASE W. RES. 116 (1982) (same).
8. Fast track differs from design-build:
In a typical fast-track situation, the owner identifies and retains the
construction contractor prior to the completion of the contract documents.
The AE issues drawings and specifications as they are ready and in a
sequence to permit construction. Time is saved since the design effort
overlaps the construction work. Money is saved, presumably, since the
project is completed sooner and the owner can shift to permanent fi-
nancing earlier than under normal circumstances. The principal disad-
vantage of the fast-track approach is that an agreement between the
owner and contractor must be reached without the benefit of a complete
set of contract documents. Such items as price and time of completion
may be more difficult to establish and agree upon under these circum-
stances.
Hapke, supra note 7, at 250.
9. Construction management is still a relatively new concept. In the traditional
owner/contractor arrangement, the owner provides the plans and specifications and
hires a general contractor to execute them. The general contractor, in turn, hires
subcontractors (e.g., plumbing, excavation, electric, dry wall, carpentry, etc.) to
perform the work. In the construction management model, the CM constitutes a
kind of "think-tank" comprised of contractors, architects, engineers and other
construction experts. The owner contracts with the CM to manage the progress of
the construction, but the owner himself hires prime contractors to do the work.
Thus, the CM has virtually no liability for the design of, execution of, or payment
for the work. Some experts believe that this method is more efficient for owners
who are familiar with the construction industry, such as public entities and de-
velopers. See generally J. SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING,
AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS § 21.04(D), at 451-53 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
SWEET]; AMERIcAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS DOCUMENT B801, STANDARD FORM
OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONSTRUCTION MANAGER (6th ed. 1987); see
also Hart, Construction Management "C.M. for Short" The New Name for an
Old Game, 8 FORUM 210 (1972); Note, The Roles of Architect and Contractor in
Construction Management, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 447 (1973).
10. Kennedy, Architects Now Double as Developers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988,
§ 8 (Real Estate), at 20, col. 1 (20%~o of those responding to AIA survey of 300
architects "indicated that they were active in development, construction management
or joint ownership situations").
11. See Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract Based Approach, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 1075, 1101 n.178 (1979) (discussing New York's attempts "to find an
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negligence, arising only when there is an existing professional re-
lationship between the parties. 2 The law of architectural malpractice
draws many analogies from the most common and familiar species
of malpractice-medical and legal malpractice. It is thought that
because the architect is a licensed professional in whom the client
reposes some measure of trust, he should be subject to the same
broad principles which govern medical and legal malpractice. These
analogies, however, do not withstand close analysis and have resulted
in confusion and inequity.
For example, when exactly does a cause of action accrue and a
statute of limitations begin to run against an architect for mal-
practice? This issue becomes particularly difficult when the defect
is latent and the damage caused by the alleged malpractice does not
occur at the time of the act of malpractice. Courts of the various
jurisdictions have generally responded in the same way they have
to the same problem as it arises in the medical and legal professions.
Some courts have chosen a modern rule 3 which favors plaintiffs,
while others have retained a common law 4 rule which favors de-
fendants. These choices, while arguably practical for the legal and
medical professions where the professional relationship is based solely
on a common law duty of reasonable care, 5 cannot be applied
mechanically to the architectural profession. The primary reason for
this is the contractual nature of the professional relationship between
the owner, architect and contractor.
This Note will explore this issue in three parts. Part II discusses
the contractual nature of the owner/architect relationship and the
judicial attempts to analogize to relationships in other professions.
Part III considers the prevailing judicial theories as to when a cause
of action accrues against architects and against professionals in
general. Finally, Part IV defines the architect's rights and duties
analysis adequate to decide whether the tort or contract statute of limitations should
apply in suits alleging architectural malpractice") [hereinafter Architectural Mal-
practice].
12. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 63-98 and accompanying text.
15. But see Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 69, 188 N.W.2d 601, 606
(1971) (under some circumstances, trier of fact might conclude that doctor contracted
to cure his patient); Mason v. W. Pennsylvania Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 358-
59, 428 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1981); Tierney, The Contractual Aspects of Malpractice,
19 WAYNE L. REV. 1457 (1973) (discussing Guilmet); Annotation, Recovery Against
Physician on Basis of Breach of Contract to Achieve Particular Result or Cure,
43 A.L.R.3D 1221 (1972) (discussing cases in which doctor contracts for specific
result).
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vis-4-vis the several different classes of plaintiffs: parties to the
contract, third-party beneficiaries, and strangers to the contract. This
Part then proposes a rationale for determining when the statute of
limitations should run for the different plaintiffs. This Note asserts
that the contractual relationship between architect and owner dis-
tinguishes architectural malpractice from other types of professional
malpractice, and that this relationship should be a substantial factor
in determining the date of accrual.
I. The Contractual Nature of the Owner/Architect Relationship
A. The Analogy to Other Professional Relationships
The owner, architect and contractor involved in a construction
project are co-adventurers in a common enterprise and parties to a
complex set of contracts.' 6 The relationship between the owner and
the architect, unlike that of physician/patient or attorney/client, is
typically based on a contract; in fact, the standard form contracts
drafted by the American Institute of Architects (AIA) are widely
used and are influential. 7 Within this commercial contractual context,
owner and architect owe each other various specific duties and are
entitled to specific rights.'" Conversely, the professional owes a
common law duty to exercise the care of a reasonable professional
in providing service to a patient or client.' 9 Moreover, not only does
16. In the typical situation, the "contract documents" consist of the contracts
between owner and architect and between owner and contractor, the general con-
ditions, technical specifications and drawings. See Hapke, supra note 7, at 249;
Jackson, supra note 6, at 517 (citing J. ACRET, ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS: THEIR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSELLITIES § 9.1, at 130 (1977) [hereinafter ACRET]). See generally
Triangle, supra note 6; Architectural Malpractice, supra note 11.
17. The AIA documents are the most widely used standard form contracts in
the construction industry. The AIA has updated eight of the 24 AIA A-Series
documents, two of the 12 B-Series, and one of the five C-Series in the 1987 editions.
Some of these documents had not been revised in over ten years. See Taylor, AIA
Publishes Revised Forms, 12 LITIGATION NEws 3 (Summer 1987).
The standard form contract between owner and architect is AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF ARCHITECTS DOCUMENT B141, STANDARD FoRM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER
AND ARCHITECT (14th ed. 1987) [hereinafter OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT]. For
an excellent overview of these standard form contracts, see generally, AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE [hereinafter HAND-
BOOK]. See also Coplan, Law: Liability and AIA Contracts, 68 PROGRESSIVE AR-
CHITECTURE 71 (Jan. 1987).
18. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
19. The standard of care required of a design professional was stated 100 years
ago:
The undertaking of an architect implies that he possesses skill and ability,
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the existence of a contract render the architectural professional
relationship fundamentally different from the medical and legal re-
lationships, but the owner/architect/contractor model itself is subject
to wide variation. Supervisory duties shared by an architect and
contractor in one project may be strictly and separately defined in
another.20 Authorizations for change orders21 may issue from the
architect in one instance and require both owner and architect ap-
proval in another. 2
2
Some generalizations, however, can be made about the respective
duties of owner, architect and contractor. The owner provides fi-
nancing for the project and makes all final decisions regarding the
execution of the contract. 2 The owner is also responsible, prior to
construction, for the survey and legal description of the site and
including taste, sufficient to enable him to perform the required services
at least ordinarily and reasonably well; and that he will exercise and
apply, in 'the given case, his skill and ability, his judgment and taste,
reasonably and without neglect. But the undertaking does not imply or
warrant a satisfactory result.
Groff, Legal Considerations for Architects and Engineers: Avoiding the Pitfalls,
41 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 17 (Mar. 1987) (quoting Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187,
188, 36 A. 104, 105 (1896)). This standard of care remains viable today:
Theoretically, American courts determine the negligence of design profes-
sionals by the same standard of care used to determine the professional
negligence of attorneys, physicians and others "engaged in professions
requiring the exercise of technical skill, [i.e.,] whether the professional
performed in accordance with the skill usually exercised by others of his
profession in the same general area.
Jackson, supra note 6, at 519-20 & n.29 (quoting Pittman Const. Co. v. New
Orleans, 178 So. 2d 312, 321 (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, 248 La. 434, 179 So.
2d 274 (1965)).
20. See SWEET, supra note 9, § 15.08, at 275-94.
21. "A [c]hange [o]rder is a written order to the [c]ontractor signed by the
[o]wner and the [airchitect, issued after execution of the contract, authorizing a
change in the [w]ork or an adjustment in the [c]ontract [slum or the [c]ontract
[t]ime ..... " See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS DOCUMENT A201, GENERAL
CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION 12.1.1 (14th ed. 1987) [here-
inafter GENERAL CONDITIONS]. The AIA forms also provide that the architect may
approve minor changes (sometimes called field orders) in the work without the
signature of the owner. See id. 2.4.1; see also Ricchini, The Authority and
Responsibility of the Architect as Administrator of the Contract, 23 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 370, 375 (1979) [hereinafter Ricchini].
For example, during the construction of a dam, suppose the contractor finds
that the site does not contain enough fill material for the project. The contractor
must then request from the owner and architect a change order authorizing him
to seek fill material from another site.
22. See GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 21, 2.2.15.
23. See Robinson, Construction Contract Administration (1985), in HANDBOOK,
supra note 17, § B-7, at 2 [hereinafter Robinson].
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for securing approvals, easements or permits as required by local
law.
24
The contractor performs the actual building of the project and
his duties typically include supervising the work, obtaining materials
and hiring subcontractors. 25 The contractor determines the appro-
priate means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures for
construction according to the plans provided by the architect. 26 Or-
dinarily, the contractor is also responsible for job site safety. 27
The architect administers the contract between the owner and the
contractor and is responsible for observing the construction process. 28
It is the architect's duty to interpret the plans, specifications and
contract documents for the contractor, to process and approve shop
drawings, 29 to certify applications for payment and to keep the owner
informed about the progress of the project.30 Under the AIA standard
form owner/contractor document, the architect has the additional
duty of hearing and settling claims and disputes. 3
B. Legal and Medical Professions
This arrangement of contracts, with its attendant allocation of
rights and duties among several parties, is quite different from
24. See id.
25. The AIA's Handbook of Professional Practice distinguishes among "su-
perintendence and supervision" which are the responsibility of the contractor,
"observation" which is the responsibility of the architect, and "inspection" which
is the responsibility of public building inspectors or representatives of governmental
agencies. See Robinson, supra note 23, § B-7, at 2.
26. See id.
27. See SWEET, supra note 9, §§ 35.01-35.10, at 811-34.
28. See Robinson, supra note 23, § B-7, at 2; see also Ricchini, supra note
21, at 372.
29. See Ricchini, supra note 21, at 372; see also infra note 75 and accompanying
text.
30. See GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 21, 2.2.5 ("on the basis of his on-
site observations as an architect, he will keep the owner informed about the progress
of the work"); see also Ricchini, supra note 21, at 372.
31. GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 21, 4.3.2-4.4.4, at 11-12. The 1987
revisions provide that when either the owner or the contractor has a claim against
the other, the parties must submit the dispute to the architect for initial deter-
mination. The architect's decision will be final, subject-to arbitration in accordance
with the American Arbitration Association Construction Industry Rules. Further-
more, the General Conditions expressly provide that submission of the claim to
the architect shall be a condition precedent to any arbitration or litigation of the
claim.
This requirement that claims must first be submitted to the architect and that
such submission shall be a condition precedent to arbitration or litigation includes
claims "alleging an error or omission by the [a]rchitect." Id. 4.3.2.
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professional relationships in the legal and medical fields.12 The pro-
fessional relationship between physician and patient, and between
attorney and client, differ from the architectural setting both in
foundation and purpose. For example, patient and physician are not
contracting parties who contemplate a common commercial purpose
or venture." Compared to the professional, the patient/client is a
layman whose medical condition or legal predicament compels him
to repose complete trust and confidence in the expertise of the
professional. In return, the professional owes a common law duty
to exercise the care of a reasonable professional in providing services
to the patient or client.14 Arguably, one who requires the services
of a physician or attorney is in a position of vulnerability-even if
that position does not entail a lawsuit or sickness.
When an owner, however, contracts for architectural services, both
parties assume a set of rights and duties in a commercial relationship.
These duties will vary according to the terms of the signed agreement
and these terms will vary according to the relative sophistication
and bargaining power of the parties. While it is true that the owner
of a project must repose trust and confidence in the expertise of
the architect, that trust is of a lesser magnitude than that which
the patient/client reposes in the expertise of the physician/attorney.
If the owner is a public body, which it often is," then it is certainly
familiar with the construction industry and service contracts in gen-
eral.36 A patient or client, on the other hand, is an outsider to the
legal or medical profession. Moreover, the owner reposes a lesser
32. See generally S. SCHREIBER, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (1967) (discussing
legal, medical and scientific malpractice).
33. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) (1985). "A
lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject
matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may: 1. Acquire
a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses. 2. Contract with a client for
a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case." Id.
34. "Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one
who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required
to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession
or trade in good standing in similar communities." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1977).
35. See SWEET, supra note 9, § 9.02, at 156-57.
36. Public owners commonly account for a sizable portion of the construction
industry. Indeed, many state statutes specifically address the relationship between
public owners and private contractors. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 135
(McKinney 1974) (requiring that all contracts for construction provide separate
contracts for: (1) heating, ventilating and air-conditioning; (2) plumbing; and (3)
electric); N.Y. PuB. BLuos. LAW § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (requiring that all
contracts for construction of a state building be let by competitive bidding).
1988] ARCHITECTURAL MALPRACTICE 517
degree of trust in the architect because, even though he contracts
directly with the architect, the construction process is a multi-party,
multi-professional endeavor.3 7 This allows risk to be kept at a min-
imum. The fact that all the contracting parties are represented by
counsel reduces risks even further. This involvement of other profes-
sionals and counsel does not typically exist in the medical and legal
contexts.
C. The Professional Standard of Care
Among the duties assumed by the architect is the duty to render
services to the owner in accordance with local professional stan-
dards.3" Thus, an action for malpractice may properly sound in
tort. 9 Nevertheless, the professional relationship remains grounded
in a contract between the client and the architect. The legal or
medical professional, however, owes a common law duty of care
which is neither grounded in contract nor commercial in nature.40
III. When Does the Statute of Limitations Begin to Run on a
Malpractice Claim Against an Architect?
37. See SWEET, supra note 9, § 5.01, at 51. "The private design professional
will make contracts with, among others, clients, consultants, employees, landlords
and sellers of goods. In addition, contracts are made between owners and prime
contractors, prime contractors and subcontractors, contractors and suppliers, em-
ployers and employees, buyers and sellers of land, and brokers and property owners."
Id.
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39. See In re Paver & Wildfoerster and Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d
669, 345 N.E.2d 565, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976); Sosnow v. Paul, 43 A.D.2d 978,
352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 780, 330 N.E.2d 643, 369
N.Y.S.2d 693 (1975).
40. The design professional's standard of care, however, remains contractual
in nature:
[Tlo determine a design professional's liability solely on foreseeability
without reference to contractual provisions creates a risk of exposing
that professional to unlimited liability. Every single responsibility of an
A/E need not be specified in a contract (certain duties are implied) and
an A/E should not be permitted to deny reasonably foreseeable respon-
sibility to a reasonably foreseeable class of individuals; however, the
foreseeability of harm to a particular plaintiff should be viewed in light
of the contracts involved in the project and an A/E's duty should be
determined by the foreseeable consequences of those tasks which he
contractually agreed to perform.
Jackson, supra note 6, at 520-21.
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A. Competing Policies
Statutes of limitations are favored by the law and serve a number
of significant policy interests. 41 Statutes of limitations: (1) protect
defendants from false or fraudulent claims that might be difficult
to disprove if not brought until after relevant evidence has been
lost or destroyed and witnesses have become unavailable; and (2)
protect the public's interest of certainty and finality in the admin-
istration of its affairs, especially in commercial transactions, and
thus, terminate contingent liabilities at specific points in time. 42
Without the protection of statutes of limitations, the architect
may be subject to lawsuits many years after the completion of a
project. This creates the danger that the defendant-architect might
be held to professional standards existing at the time of the claim
rather than at the time of the conduct.4 1 "While technically this
would not be correct, juries might actually hold the [professional]
to such a higher standard in order to compensate the plaintiff." ' 4
In addition, the possibility of such claims being made many years
later would require insurance companies to keep large reserves. This,
in turn, would drive up premiums.4 1
Since the policies underlying statutes of limitations are geared
toward protecting defendants, a statute of limitations is expressed
as "one of grace, permitting avoidance of liability.'' 46 As such, it
must be pleaded and becomes an affirmative defense with the burden
of establishing it on the defendant .4  The statute is triggered by the
41. See Flanagan v. Mt. Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d
871, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969).
42. See SWEET, supra note 9, § 27.03(G), at 596 (citing Gates Rubber Co. v.
U.S. Marine Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J., currently United
States Supreme Court Justice); see also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) (statutes of limitations "are designed
to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded and
witnesses have disappeared").
43. See SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CON-
STRUCTION PROCESS § 32.06, at 733 (2d ed. 1977).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.S.C. 1976) (citing South Carolina
Mental Health Comm'n v. May, 226 S.C. 108, 83 S.E.2d 713 (1954)).
47. See Immediate v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 48 N.Y.2d 671, 673, 397 N.E.2d
385, 386, 421 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (1979) (in order to preserve affirmative defense
of statute of limitations, defendant need only state the defense in its answer; no
need to set out argument until facts are made available); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &
R. § 3018 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (requiring certain affirmative defenses to be
pleaded; otherwise they are waived).
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accrual of a cause of action. 48 State statutes generally do not define
when a cause of action accrues and thus when the statute begins
to run. In this situation, the issue is left to judicial determination
and is generally a question of law for the court. 49 Only where a
factual determination is involved should the issue be submitted to
a jury. 0
Depending on the applicable law and facts, a statute of limitations
for architectural malpractice51 can begin to run either at the time
48. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 203(a) (McKinney 1972).
49. See Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 142, 153 A.2d 477, 481-82 (1959).
50. See Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. Campbell, Rea, Hayes & Large, 492 F. Supp.
67, 75 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (citing Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 142, 153
A.2d 477, 481-82 (1959)).
51. The various legislatures have enacted two kinds of statutes that specifically
govern suits against design professionals-statutes of limitations and statutes of
repose. Statutes of limitations begin to run when a cause of action accrues against
the defendant. Statutes of repose, also known as completion statutes, begin to run
at some specific date, usually the date of substantial completion of the project,
without regard to whether a cause of action has arisen. See SWEET, supra note 9,
§ 27.03(G), at 597. The significant distinction between these statutes is that a statute
of limitations cuts off the plaintiff's remedy, whereas a statute of repose cuts off
the right of action itself, before it ever vests. See ACRET, supra note 16, § 1107,
at 258-59.
See ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.055 (1983); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112 (Supp. 1987);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 337.1, 337.15 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-
127 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584a (Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 8127
(Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE § 12-310 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(C)
(West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-51 to 9-3-52 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-
8 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 5-241 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-20-1, 34-4-20-3,
34-4-20-4 (Burns 1973), 34-4-20-2 (Burns Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2772
(West 1983 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (1980); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 2B
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1988); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5839 (1987);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.097 (Vernon
Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208 (Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
223 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 11.202, 11.206 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 508.4-b (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 23-1-26 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01-44 (1974); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 109 (West Supp. 1988) (amended 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.135 (1983);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 65.1 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-29 (Supp.
1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-2-9, 15-2-11 (Supp. 1978), 15-2-10 (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-314 (Supp. 1978); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a
(Vernon Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1977); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-
24-2 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.16.300, 4.16.310 (Supp. 1988);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West 1966) (amended 1975); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-3-110
to 1-3-112 (1985).
These so-called statutes of repose have been the more popular legislative solution
to the problem of expanding tort liability in the construction industry. Between
1964 and 1969, some thirty states enacted completion statutes. See ACRET, supra
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of the malpractice, at the time of damage, at completion of the
project or at discovery of the damage.12 Because a plaintiff may
find his action barred before he discovers his injury and an architect
may be hauled into court many years after he has fulfilled his
contractual duties and the building has left his control, there are
several views as to how a court properly determines when a cause
of action accrues for architectural malpractice.
The traditional view holds that the architectural malpractice statute
of limitations begins to run at the time of the wrongful conduct. 3
A contrary view, which represents the modern judicial trend, holds
that the statute begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or should
have discovered his damage. 4 This Note contends that the architect/
owner/contractor relationship is fundamentally different from the
other professional relationships to which it has been analogized;55
therefore, the issue of when a statute begins to run should depend
on the nature of the professional relationship between the plaintiff
and the architect. In malpractice actions, where the plaintiff and
defendant relationship is grounded in a contract defining their rights
and duties, the better rule is that the statute begins to run at the
time of the alleged malpractice.16 In negligence actions, where the
plaintiff and defendant have no professional relationship and no
contractual rights and duties, the better rule is that the statute begins
to run when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his
injury."
note 16, § 11.09, at 262 (citing Rosenberg v. N. Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d
662 (1972)). New York has declined to join those jurisdictions that have enacted
special statutes of repose for design professionals. This Note asserts that the statute
of repose approach fails to consider that the plaintiff suing an architect for
malpractice stands in a much different position than does a plaintiff suing for
negligence.
52. See Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run on Negligent
Design Claim Against Architect, 90 A.L.R.3D 507 (1979) [hereinafter Annotation];
ACRET, supra note 16, at 244-72.
53. See infra notes 58-92 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
Two states have adopted a "mixed rule" different from the rule recommended
by this Note. In Florida, the four-year statute begins to run from the date of
actual possession of the project or completion of the contract, whichever is later,
except that when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from when the
defect is or should have been discovered. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1982); see also
Kelley v. School Bd. of Seminole County, 435 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 1983).
In Nebraska, the statute provides for a four-year period running from the time
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B. The Completion Rule
The traditional view, adopted by a majority of states, is that an
action for architectural malpractice accrues at the time of the wrong-
ful conduct." Thus, the statute begins to run even if a structural
or other type of failure59 has not yet occurred. Some courts take
the position that mere ignorance of facts constituting a cause of
action, that comes into existence when there is a breach of duty,60
does not prevent the statute from running. Difficulty in discovering
damage is irrelevant. 61 Other courts state that at the time of the
malpractice, in the allegedly negligent design, there is an actionable
legal injury, no matter how slight.62 According to one court, one
could not seriously contend that if the plaintiff had discovered the
negligence of the defendant architect at the time it was committed,
the plaintiff would have had no right of action simply because the
building had not yet fallen down at that time. 63
Under the traditional view, the date of accrual should be directly
related to the architect's duties under the contract. If the architect
has contracted to provide only plans and specifications, the statute
should begin to run no later than at the time of tender of the
documents. 64 It is at this point that the architect has fulfilled his
contractual obligations and is entitled to demand payment for services
of the act or omission that gave rise to the cause of action. If, however, the cause
of action could not reasonably have been discovered within four years, the plaintiff
is then entitled to a two-year period beginning at the date of discovery of the
cause of action or of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever
is earlier. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-223 (1985); see also Grand Island School Dist. v.
Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 565, 279 N.W.2d 603, 607 (1979) ("even without
section 25-223, R.S. Supp. 1978, a discovery rule is applicable to a tort action
based on latent defects in improvements to real property").
58. See County of Milwaukee v. Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, 43 Wis. 2d 445,
455, 168 N.W.2d 559, 562 (1969); see also Comptroller of Virginia ex rel Virginia
Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 759, 232 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977) (owner's
cause of action for improper design by architect accrues when the plans receive
final approval); S. Burlington School Dist. v. Goodrich, 135 Vt. 601, 604, 382
A.2d 220, 222 (1977) ("the rule in Vermont, except where modified by statute,
has been that the cause of action accrues when the act upon which the legal action
is based took place and not when the damage became known").
59. See Thornton, Failure Statistics Categorized by Cause and Generic Class,
1985 LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS AND CONTRACTORS 151 (1985).
60. See Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).
61. See King, 217 Va. at 759, 232 S.E.2d at 900.
62. See Wellston Co. v. Sam N. Hodges, Jr. & Co., 114 Ga. App. 424, 151
S.E.2d 481 (1966).
63. See Annotation, supra note 52, at 514 (citing Wellston, 114 Ga. App. at
425, 151 S.E.2d at 482).
64. See SWEET, supr note 9, §§ 16.01-16.02, at 313-21.
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rendered. If, however, the architect has contracted to supervise
construction of the project, his contractual duties are not discharged
until the building is "substantially completed. '65
1. Substantial Completion/Final Certification
The term "substantial completion" is a term of art, and should
be distinguished from "final certification." Substantial completion
generally means that the building or project has reached a point
where it is ready for the use for which it was intended and that
whatever work remains to be done is minor.6 It has been held in
New York that the statute at issue did not begin to run until the
architect authorized issuance of the final certificate for payment. 67
The same courts, however, point out that the statute will be tolled 6
until final certification for payment only when such certification
represents a significant duty of the architect and concomitant right
of the owner. 69 Where issuance of the final certificate is merely an
administrative act, courts will choose a more appropriate date for
accrual of the action. 70 New York courts realize and recognize that
65. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
66. "When the [airchitect on the basis of an inspection determines that the
work or designated portion thereof is substantially complete, he will then prepare
a [c]ertificate of [s]ubstantial [c]ompletion which shall establish the [diate of
[s]ubstantial [clompletion .... " See GENERAL CoNrITIoN s, supra note 21, 9.8.1.
"Substantial completion" describes the status of a construction project that is
ready for its intended use. This does not mean, however, that every detail must
be in place. "Final certification" refers to the point at which the contractor has
fulfilled all his obligations under the contract and the architect is prepared to certify
to the owner that the project is built to his satisfaction and that the contractor
is entitled to payment of sums due on the contract.
67. See Board of Education v. Celotex Corp., 88 A.D.2d 713, 714, 451 N.Y.S.2d
290, 291 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 684, 444 N.E.2d 1006, 458 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1982).
68. Tolling has been defined in the following manner: "To suspend or stop
temporarily as the statute of limitations is tolled during the defendant's absence
from the jurisdiction and during the plaintiff's minority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1334 (5th ed. 1979).
69. See Celotex, 88 A.D.2d at 714, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
70. See State v. Lundin, 60 N.Y.2d 987, 459 N.E.2d 486, 471 N.Y.S.2d 261
(1983). The AIA Owner-Architect Agreement expressly provides an accrual date:
Causes of action between the parties to this [a]greement pertaining to
acts or failures to act shall be deemed to have accrued and the applicable
statutes of limitations shall commence to run not later than either the
date of [slubstantial [c]ompletion for acts or failures to act occurring
prior to [s]ubstantial [c]ompletion, or the date of the issuance of the
final [c]ertificate for [playment for acts or failures to act occurring after
[slubstantial [clompletion.
OWNER-ARCITECT AGREEMENT, supra note 17, 9.3.
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the architect/owner relationship is contractual in nature, not simply
a matter of common law duty.
The "completion rule" serves the second policy enunciated above.7'
If it is desirable for commercial entities to obtain certainty and
finality in the administration of their affairs, then it is also certainly
imperative for architects, whose exposure to liability is expanding
and whose insurance costs are skyrocketing, to obtain such certainty
and finality.72 On the other hand, it is argued that this interest is
protected at the expense of plaintiffs whose suits are barred before
there is actual injury or before actual injury is discovered.73
2. New York's Completion Rule
The New York Legislature has not promulgated a statutory date
of accrual, and consequently the courts have adopted the completion
rule. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Associates7 4 the New York
Court of Appeals held that an action for architectural malpractice
brought more than three but less than six years after the date of
accrual was barred as to tort damages but timely as to contract
damages. 75 The Sears, Roebuck court reaffirmed an earlier rule,
enunciated in Sosnow v. Paul7 6 that an action against an architect,
whether in tort or contract, accrues at the time of completion of
construction. 77 Another New York court has added that "[c]ompletion
is not a statutorily defined word but must be judicially interpreted
in light of the given situation and the responsibilities of the parties
71. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
72. See Hapke, supra note 7, at 255. For an excellent discussion of the different
types of A/E malpractice insurance, see Note, The Current Status of Professional
Architects' and Engineers' Malpractice Liability Insurance, 45 INs. CouNs. J. 39
(1978) (discussing "claims made" and "occurrence" insurance policies); see also
Chapman, The Liability of Design Professionals to the Surety, 20 FORUM 591 (1985).
One commentator described the situation in this way:
[Wlith the annual premium for a typically sized five-member engineering
or architectural firm anywhere from $5,000 to $20,000 or more, and
with deductibles going from a minimum of $2,000 to $25,000, $50,000
or even $100,000 for larger firms, some design professionals are dropping
their insurance coverage and "going bare'"-practicing without insur-
ance-on the assumption that costs will be lower if their firms simply
defend claims made against them with their own resources.
Berreby, supra note 5, at 31.
73. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
74. 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977).
75. See id. at 393, 372 N.E.2d at 556, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
76. 43 A.D.2d 978, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 780,
330 N.E.2d 643, 369 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1975).
77. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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in carrying out their agreement.17  In some cases, the architect's
duties are complete when construction is finished or when fees have
been paid.79 In other instances, the architect's duty will extend beyond
these events until the issuance of a final certificate for payment.8 0
If the issuance of the certificate was "not merely a ministerial act
but represented a substantial contractual right of plaintiff-owner and
a [concomitant] contractual responsibility of defendant-architect in
completing the project," then the professional relationship continued
until the issuance.8 1 The courts of other jurisdictions are in accord
with regard to this distinction.82
New York courts also recognize the distinction between a plaintiff
with whom the architect has a professional relationship and a plaintiff
who is a stranger to the contract. In Cubito v. Kreisberg,3 the
plaintiff, a tenant in an apartment house designed by the defendant-
architect, slipped and fell in the building's laundry room.84 She
brought suit alleging that the room was negligently designed so that
water collected on the floor." The architects had completed their
contract and issued a final certificate on May 7, 1973.86 The plaintiff
sustained her injury on October 6, 1977.87 The trial court denied
the architect's motion to dismiss and was affirmed by the appellate
division.88 The court held that because the plaintiff was not a party
to the professional relationship, the cause of action sounded in
simple negligence rather than in malpractice. 9 Therefore, the cause
of action accrued at the time of injury, as the plaintiff contended,
rather than at the completion date, as the architect contended.9 The
statute of limitations applicable in this case provides a three-year
period for both negligence and malpractice other than medical mal-
78. Board of Education v. Celotex Corp., 88 A.D.2d 713, 714, 451 N.Y.S.2d
290, 291 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 684, 444 N.E.2d 1006, 458 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1982).
79. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
81. See Celotex, 88 A.D.2d at 714, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
82. See, e.g., County of Milwaukee v. Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, 43 Wis.
2d 445, 452, 168 N.W.2d 559, 562 (1969).
83. 69 A.D.2d 738, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 900,
415 N.E.2d 979, 434 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1980).
84. See id. at 740, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d 738, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2d Dep't 1979),
aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 900, 415 N.E.2d 979, 434 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1980).
89. See id. at 742, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
90. See id. at 744, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
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practice. 9' An action founded on simple negligence accrues "when
the wrongful invasion of personal rights occurred by reason of
conduct of the wrongdoer." The court implied, however, that the
completion rule properly applies only where there is a professional
relationship between the parties and the action sounds in mal-
practice. 93
C. The Discovery Rule
The modern trend favors the "discovery rule." Under this rule,
a plaintiff's cause of action for architectural malpractice accrues
when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered in the exercise
of due diligence, his damage. 94 For example, in the leading Florida
case, a school board sued its architect for damages resulting from
a leaking roof.95 The three school buildings in question were com-
91. See id. at .742,. 419 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (citing N.Y. Crv. PR¢c. L. & R.
§ 214(5)-(6) (McKinney 1986)).
92. See Cubito, 69 A.D.2d at 743, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
93. See id.
.94. See Mills v. Killian, 273 S.C. 66, 70, 254 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1979)("[t]he
modern trend in professional negligence or malpractice cases ... is that accrual
is upon discovery by the injured party"); see also Med-Mar, Inc. v. Dilworth, 214
Pa. Super. 402, 257 A.2d 910 (1969); Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Pattillo
Const. Co., Inc., 254 Ga. 461, 461, 330 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1985) (because defendant
contractor initiated construction without working drawings approved by owner, by
amendment to the contract defendant agreed to assume all responsibilities of architect
for this project); Society of Mt. Carmel v. Fox, 31 111. App. 3d 1060, 335 N.E.2d
588 (1975); Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967); Orleans
Parish School Bd. v. Pittman Const. Co., 261 La. 665, 260 So. 2d 661 (1972);
Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440, 258 A.2d 177 (1969); Board
of Directors v. Regency Tower Venture, 2 Haw. App. 506, 635 P.2d 244 (1981);
Greenbrier Village Condominium Two Ass'n v. Keller Inv., Inc., 409 N.W.2d 519,
524 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Bulau v. Hector Plumbing & Heating Co., 402 N.W.2d
528, 530 (Minn. 1987); Kundahl v. Barnett, 5 Wash. App. 227, 486 P.2d 1164
(1971) (discovery rule applied to surveyor). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 144-45 (4th ed. 1971).
95. See Kelley v. School Bd. of Seminole County, 435 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1983)
(discussing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1977)). The applicable statute contains the
following provision:
[The statute of limitations shall be four years in] action[s] founded on
the design, planning or construction of an improvement to real property,
with the time running from the date of actual possession by the owner,
the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of
abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion
or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered
architect, or licensed contractor and his empioyer, whichever date is
latest; except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time
runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered
with the exercise of due diligence.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
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pleted in 1969 and 1970, and the leaks began in 1970 and 1971 .96
Extensive repairs were attempted, but eventually all three roofs had
to be replaced. 97 The leaks continued through 1977 at which time
the board brought suit. 9 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
a grant of summary judgment and held that the four-year statute
of limitations, which specifically applies to architectural malpractice,
began to run at the discovery of the defect.9
The discovery rule remedies a significant injustice by allowing
plaintiffs to pursue legal action without fear that their suit will be
barred before its crucial elements are discovered or discoverable. At
the same time, it may work a severe hardship on architects by
subjecting them to lawsuits many years after a plan has been carried
out and the building has left their control. Indeed, in some juris-
dictions, a minor, for whom the statute is tolled until the age of
majority,'10 could potentially bring a suit twenty years after com-
pletion of the project.' 0 This clearly violates the important public
policy of promoting stability and finality in commercial transac-
tions.102 In addition, such stale suits are difficult to defend. 03 It has
been argued that the essential materials for a defense are the plans
and specifications themselves and that the architect suffers no det-
riment by the passage of time if these documents have been pre-
served.10 4 This view, however, is again the result of an
oversimplification of the construction process. The original design
is drawn by the architect along with consulting engineers, approved
by the owner, executed by the contractor, and often subjected to
many change orders and field orders during the course of construc-
tion. 105 Witnesses and other evidence regarding these transactions
may prove difficult to obtain after the passage of many years.
The discovery rule is imported from the vocabulary of medical
malpractice, and if it is to be applied to architectural malpractice
the analogy warrants examination. In Flanagan v. Mount Eden
General Hospital,'°6 the New York Court of Appeals distinguished
96. See Kelley, 435 So. 2d at 805-06.
97. See id. at 805.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. New York prohibits a minor from suing more than 10 years after his cause
of action accrues. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney 1986).
101. See supra note 43.
102. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
103. See SWEET, supra note 9, § 27.03(G), at 597.
104. See ACRET, supra note 16, at 257.
105. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
106. 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
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mere negligent medical treatment cases, for which the cause of action
accrues at the time of the malpractice, from cases where a "foreign
object" is negligently left in the patient's body, to which the discovery
rule applies:
The policy of insulating defendants from the burden of defending
stale claims brought by a party who, with reasonable diligence,
could have instituted the action more expeditiously is not a con-
vincing justification for the harsh consequences resulting from
applying the same concept of accrual in foreign object cases as
is applied in medical treatment cases. A clamp, though immersed
within the patient's body and undiscovered for a long period of
time, retains its identity so that a defendant's ability to defend
a "stale" claim is not unduly impaired.10 7
The court found a "fundamental difference" between the two types
of cases. When a foreign object is left in the body, the court
continued, "no claim can be made that the patient's action may be
feigned or frivolous [and] there is no possible causal break between
the negligence of the doctor or hospital and the patient's injury."'' 0
The foreign object/discovery rule is codified in the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR).' °9
An action for medical malpractice accrues at the time of the act
and the statute runs for two years and six months; 10 however, an
action based on a foreign object left in the body accrues at the
date of discovery and must be commenced within one year."' The
distinction provided by Flanagan and the CPLR suggests that a
physician who leaves a foreign object commits a grievous wrong
which is qualitatively different from garden-variety medical mal-
practice.
107. Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
108. Id. at 430, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
109. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1986). The statute
provides that "where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object
in the body of the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of the
date of such discovery or of the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably
lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier."
110. See id. Section 214-a contains the following provision:
An action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice must be commenced
within two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained
of or last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same
illness, injury or condition which gave rise to said act, omission or
failure ....
Id.
111. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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D. The Continuous. Treatment Doctrine
In jurisdictions which have adopted the completion rule for ar-
chitectural malpractice actions, the plaintiff-owner is entitled to an
extension of the statutory period for as long as the professional
relationship continues. 112 This "continuous treatment" doctrine, like
the foreign objects exception, is borrowed from the law of medical
malpractice." 3 The traditional justification for the doctrine is that
"[iut would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt
corrective efforts by serving a summons on the physician or hospital
superintendent or by filing a notice of claim. 1 4 In the context of
architectural malpractice, failure to adopt the rule could provide an
incentive to conceal design defects or to delay progress of the work
until the statutory period has run."5
IV. A Proposed Mixed Rule
A. Distinguishing Malpractice From Negligence
Malpractice and negligence, while very similar in terms of the
legal analyses which attend them, are not synonymous. One court
has observed:
[M]alpractice, in its strict sense, means the negligence of a member
of a profession in his relations with his client or patient....
[A]n action for malpractice springs from the correlative rights
and duties assumed by the parties through the relationship. On
the other hand, the wrongful conduct of the professional in
rendering services to his client resulting in injury to a party outside
the relationship is simple negligence."16
This distinction is notable especially as to the architect whose mal-
practice liability has a contractual context and whose negligence
liability is grounded in a common law duty of reasonable care." 7
112. See County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358
N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1974).
113. See Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962).
114. See id. at 156, 187 N.E.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321-22.
115. The doctrine is now applied to other professionals, as well as to physicians
and architects. See Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 436 N.E.2d 496, 451 N.Y.S.2d
46 (1982) (attorneys).
116. See Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d 738, 742, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (2d
Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 900, 415 N.E.2d 979, 434 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1980).
I17. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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With respect to substantive law, architectural malpractice embraces
aspects of both tort and contract. 118 Accordingly, the procedural law
in this area should reflect this duality as well.
Malpractice properly refers only to parties involved in a profes-
sional relationship; thus, an architectural malpractice action can only
be brought by one who contracts with the architect or one who is
intended to benefit from such a contract. The typical third-party
beneficiary in this context is the contractor, or perhaps the sub-
contractor. It is not unusual for an owner and architect to anticipate
this situation and to provide in their agreement that they intend to
create no third-party rights.' 19
B. Elements of Both Tort and Contract
All professionals owe a duty of care, whether based in contract
or tort. Medical and legal malpractice are based squarely on a
common law tort duty to exercise the care of a reasonable profes-
sional in treating the patient or counseling the client.' 20 By contrast,
an architect's duties, including the duty to exercise reasonable care,
arise in a contractual and commercial context. Thus, when an ar-
chitect breaches his contract by failing to exercise due care, the
damaged party may sue in either contract or tort. 2'
As shown by cases determining whether to apply the tort or
contract statute of limitations in a given situation, the law of ar-
chitectural malpractice is informed by both tort and contract prin-
ciples. In Sears, Roebuck, the New York Court of Appeals held
that choosing the applicable limitations period "is properly related
to the remedy sought," not to the theory of liability:
Absent the contract between [owner and architect], no services
would have been performed and thus there would have been no
claims. It should make no difference then how the asserted liability
is classified or described, or whether it is said that, although not
expressed, an agreement to exercise due care in the performance
of the agreed services is to be implied; it suffices that all liability
alleged in this complaint had its genesis in the contractual rela-
tionship of the parties.' 22
118. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
119. See OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT, supra note 17, 9.7.
120. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
122. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Associates, 43 N.Y.2d 389, 396, 372
N.E.2d 555, 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770-71 (1977).
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The action against the architect in this case was brought after the
three-year tort statute had run, but within the six-year contract
statute; therefore, the court allowed the malpractice action to pro-
ceed, but limited the proof of damages to those allowed in contract. 13
The court gave proper recognition to the tort and contract elements
of the case in choosing the six-year contract statute. 124 The court,
however, did not have to decide the issue of when the cause of
action accrued. Following state precedent, the court reaffirmed that
the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run at the
completion of the project.' 25
Sears, Roebuck stands for the proposition that the law of archi-
tectural malpractice, both procedural and substantive, is informed
by both tort and contract principles. Therefore, the question of
when the cause of action accrues should be similarly informed. The
contractual nature of the professional relationship deserves due con-
sideration. Contractual concepts and policies are crucial to any
discussion of when the cause of action accrues.
C. A Proposed Rule
This Note recommends adoption of an equitable rule that borrows
from both the completion rule and the discovery rule and takes into
account the tortious and contractual aspects of a cause of action.
1. Owner Versus Architect
A true "malpractice" cause of action lies only where the parties
have a professional relationship, such as patient and physician or
client and attorney. 2 6 Even if the malpractice action sounds in tort
and is governed by a tort statute of limitations (which is shorter
than the contract statute), 27 the professional relationship between
owner and architect remains one based on contract. Because of this
contractual relationship, an owner has a cause of action as soon as
the malpractice occurs. 28 Accordingly, if an architect negligently
designs a stairway by specifying the wrong type of screws, for
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 770.
126. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
127. Compare N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 213 (McKinney 1983) (breach of
contract statute of limitations is six years from date of breach) with id. § 214
(McKinney 1986) (negligence statute of limitations is three years from date of
accrual).
128. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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example, the owner immediately has an action for malpractice. The
owner need not wait until more serious damage occurs in order to
sue. At the latest, the cause of action may accrue upon completion
of construction.
a. Continuous Treatment
The contractual nature of the relationship suggests that the con-
tinuous treatment doctrine would still apply. 29 Nevertheless, a subtle
distinction should be noted. In the medical and legal contexts the
continuous treatment doctrine is premised on the great reliance placed
by the patient or client in the professional's expertise. The statute
is tolled because the patient or client's vulnerable position renders
the option of bringing suit impractical. 3 0 So too, an owner must
repose trust and confidence in the architect's expertise; however, the
owner is a contracting party with contractually defined rights and
duties. As a contracting party, who has the benefit of counsel, the
owner does not rely on the architect in the same way that the patient
or client relies on the professional. The continuous treatment doc-
trine, in the architectural context, is more properly based on the
contractual, relationship. Until the terms of the contract are fully
performed, the professional relationship continues and the architect
is responsible for his services. 3 ' Thus, where the architect attempts
to remedy a leaking roof after the project has been substantially
completed, the statute is tolled until the architect completes his
services and authorizes issuance of a final certificate for payment., 2
The continuous treatment in this context is properly viewed as a
continuation of contractual duties, rather than the continuation of
a relationship based heavily on trust.
b. Restricted "Discovery Rule"
Owners should nonetheless be entitled to a narrowly applied dis-
covery rule for cases involving fraud, gross negligence and intentional
wrongdoing on the part of the architect. In New York, an exception
to the general rule that a cause of action for malpractice accrues
at the time of the negligent act has been carved out for medical
malpractice cases which involve a "foreign object" negligently left
129. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
131. See generally OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT, supra note 17.
132. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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in the patient's body.'33 In these cases, the various policies behind
the statute of limitations are not violated by deviation from the
general rule. There is no risk of fraudulent claims, nor is there a
lack of evidence after the passage of time. 34 This distinction between
the foreign object cases and the ordinary medical malpractice cases
suggests that where professional misconduct rises to the level of
gross negligence, such as leaving a clamp or sponge in a patient's
body, the patient is entitled to a later date of accrual.
Similarly, the owner is entitled to a relaxation of the "contractual"
standard of accrual when the architect's misconduct rises to this
more egregious level. Where the architect has committed fraud, gross
negligence or intentional wrongdoing, there is no risk that the plain-
tiff's claims are stale or without merit. In addition, where the
architect's misconduct is more flagrant than mere negligence, he
should not be entitled to the benefit of the presumption that older
claims are more difficult to defend.' This is especially true where
the architect's misconduct was deliberately calculated to conceal the
wrongdoing.
2. Contractor as Third-Party Beneficiary Versus Architect
Even though the contractor is not a party to the owner/architect
agreement, he should be subject to the same accrual dates as the
owner by virtue of his status as a third-party beneficiary of the
contract. 3 6 Even when the owner/architect agreement purports to
negate all third party rights, 37 the fact remains that the owner/
architect agreement does not exist in a vacuum. The owner and
architect cannot alone construct a building or bridge. The agreement
necessarily foresees the eventual hiring of a general contractor or
a series of prime contractors to execute the plans and specifications.
3. Strangers to the Contract Versus Architect
Third parties who are not beneficiaries to the contract have no
professional relationship with the architect. As strangers to the con-
133. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
135. See id.
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302-315 (1981).
137. Article 9 of AIA Document B141 contains such a provision. "Nothing
contained in this [aigreement shall create a contractual relationship with or a cause
of action in favor of a third party against either the [o]wner or [a]rchitect." See
OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT, supra note 17, 9.7.
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tract and the professional relationship, their injury, when proximately
caused by the architect, does not give rise to an action for mal-
practice. 3 8 Their cause of action sounds in simple negligence. 3 9 As
such, the negligence cause of action properly accrues when the
plaintiff has knowledge, or should have knowledge, of all the essential
elements'of the cause of action. Therefore, no action arises until
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his injury. 14°
The discovery rule is the fairer rule for strangers to the owner/
architect contract for the same reasons that the completion rule is
the fairer rule for parties to the contract. A party to the contract
is immediately damaged and a cause of action for malpractice accrues
as soon as the malpractice occurs.' A stranger to the contract,
however, is not damaged until he knows or should know that injury
has taken place.
V. Conclusion
When selecting a rule to determine when a cause of action accrues
against an architect, the courts of the various jurisdictions tend to
choose either the discovery rule or the completion rule without
considering the relationship between the parties. This Note has es-
tablished that a strict adherence to either rule will produce hardships
for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is recommended that a more
flexible rule be applied which takes into account the contractual
setting of the professional relationship between owner and architect,
and that analogies to the medical and legal professions be avoided.
Jeffrey R. Cruz
138. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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